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Introduction
Capital flight is unfortunately a too much differentiated concept, and the usual measurement concepts produce a too wide band of estimates (Loungani and Mauro 2000) . Our study introduces unit-values analysis as a new tool in order to estimate one channel of flight, namely trade-related capital flight. Unit-value indexes are commonly used in the empirical literature to analyse many international trade issues, particularly price competitiveness. They were not yet applied for the detection of "pure" systematic pricing practices of firms. We analyse trade-related capital flight from Russia. The former state monopoly in trade was lifted in mid-1992, but major controls over the capital account remained. All experts agree that capital flight soared in the 1990s. With central control over capital flows, the underpricing of exports and the overpricing of imports becomes a major flight channel. Our study concentrates on fake invoices in imports of differentiated goods. While capital flight through the export of raw material, oil, gas and the import of some staple food (wheat) seems to be rather well documented, few light was shed on capital flight through the main part of imports --differentiated goods. Some experts assume that capital flight through imports of highly diversified commodities was even higher than that through exports of raw materials (Tikhomirov 1997) . The study is organised as follows: section two presents the history and channels of trade-related capital flight from Russia. We describe capital flight through differences between market and contract or transfer prices. Section three provides the essentials of the method for finding "pure" price differences from unit values. Section four tests for the importance and systematic of price deviations. We use multilateral Törnquist translog index numbers to construct import prices from EU exports of manufactured goods to Russia and compare them with prices of exports to other countries. Section five concludes.
Trade-related capital flight from Russia
The size of capital flight from Russia is estimated to have been enormous, especially in years prior to 1999 (between bn 14 and bn 36 US-Dollar in 1996 and 1997 , Tikhomirov 1997 , Sheets 1995 . These estimates stood for about 11 to 27 percent of Russia's gross foreign debt. The non-availability of foreign exchange for debt-serving institutions (mainly the central government) increased the financial fragility of the Russian economy and contributed to higher interest rates throughout the economy, putting an additional IWH __________________________________________________________________ 6 financial burden on all companies. Capital flight was the reason for weak control over monetary aggregates, for less tax incomes, it increased the strain on the (social) expenditure side of the fiscal balances and, certainly, contributed to short-term deficit financing that led directly into the financial crisis in August 1998. In addition, some forms generate transaction costs reducing even potential profits on the level of those enterprises that transfer incomes abroad. The causes for capital flight in a period of systemic transformation are well known: in an early stage, the former nomenclature (or communist leadership) tried to transfer its earlier stolen assets abroad. Tax evasion is another motive, mainly for the emerging private sector. Political instability causes managers of big state-owned or even privatised companies to search for a safe haven instead of declaring profits, etc. etc.
The wide span of the estimates poses some methodological questions. We find two approaches in literature: the balance-of-payments analysis, and price comparisons. The bop analysis is based on flows in the capital account and on changes in the position of net errors and omissions. This method may overestimate capital flight for several reasons. One reason is linked to the general position of a country in the international economy. For a country like Russia exporting mainly raw material and energy, the structural surplus in trade needs to be coupled with capital exports. It is a tricky task to disentangle capital flight from normal capital export. A second cause of capital movements are normal portfolio diversification strategies of asset holders. When investors wish to correct their portfolio owing to factors such as a financial crisis in another region of the world, the outflow of capital is hardly to call capital flight. Compared with most Central and East European transition countries, where the current and capital accounts have been already liberalised, there were many controls on foreign exchange movements, particularly in the period under investigation (IMF, 2000) . Hence, there are and there were yet only few occasions for non-trade related capital flight. 1 With severe controls, the main flight channel is through trade: artificially low export revenues and high import expenditures.
The channels of trade-related capital flight are in general (a) barter, (b) sham credits, (d) transfer pricing and (c) fake invoices. In case of barter, the domestic firm exchanges exported commodities directly into imported ones. The foreign partner pays an additional charge, which remains on a foreign bank account. In case of sham credits, the domestic firm grants a credit on exports. The credit is meant to default artificially, and the export yields an official loss. Both forms were typically in an early stage of Russian transition, when Russia's financial and banking system did not yet provide standard financial services for trade deals ( Tikhomirov 1997) . Transfer pricing prevails in international firms with co-operative relations in production. It is mainly a playground for a producer in, say the EU, establishing a production unit in Russia (or other CEE countries) in line with outsourcing strategies. The mother company delivers some intermediate good to the unit in Russia for outward processing charging intra-firm prices; and the use of inner prices rather aims at avoiding taxes in the EU. The bilateral operation can be easily enlarged for the multilateral case which includes units in several countries with the headquarter steering the commodity and payment flows according to net profit maximisation. Because Russian manufacturing firms very seldom establish this kind of co-operation with affiliated units abroad, we assume that false invoicing is the broadest channel of capital flight from Russia since the mid of the 1990s.
With fake invoices, domestically based companies sell (deliver) abroad for lower prices in international currency than they really charge customers (foreign units), or they buy abroad for higher prices than they really pay to their suppliers. False invoicing 2 could be the purpose of middleman firms established by domestic companies abroad. A company in a certain country A, say Russia, establishes a trading house in a second country B, say Germany. This establishment changes the hitherto direct and "normal" channel of trade. The 'middleman' buys from the German producer at the market price and re-sells it to the Russian mother firm at a higher price (see Figure 1 ). The trading house realises the profit, which will be taxed according to German tax law, but the net income of the Russian mother firm remains abroad (or can be re-patriated for financial investment purposes). If the middleman company is located in a third country C, say, Cyprus, the whole trade operation is called 'transit trade' of country C and indirect trade of countries A and B.
Trade related capital flight via middleman trade is not a phenomenon new for Russia. It was even a fact in closed economies w ith state monopoly in foreign trade. The increasing number of trading houses in east-west trade in the 1970s and 1980s also mirrors the organisation of capital flight from the centrally planned and closed economies often organised by members of the communist leadership. (Of course, traditional trading houses also served for solving counter trade ( Gabrisch and Stankovsky, 1989) ). The new private, privatised and even yet state-owned, but lesscontrolled Russian companies exploit under free trade conditions those channels state firms used for capital flight under the Soviet era. And the mushrooming trading houses in some smaller low-tax countries in Europe in the 1990s give evidence of a common False invoicing practice increases not only macroeconomic burdens, but reduce also efficiency on the micro level. The purpose of the establishment of offshore trading houses is not to increase turnover (and production) but to enlarge a market exchange of goods and money by a non-market exchange. This raises costs for the entire economy: the company bears transaction and financing costs for the establishment and running of the trading house. Assume alternatively a legal tax relief the exporting or importing company could benefit from. Then, the net profit of the firm would be higher without running the trading house, and the welfare effect would be positive.
The appropriate approach to measuring overwhelmingly trade-related capital flight would be the comparison between 'world market prices' and prices in invoices. When world prices are known, capital flight via false invoicing might be detected pretty soon by tax authorities. World market prices, however, are not always known, and capital flight might be underestimated. World market prices seem to be mostly known in the case of raw materials and other, more or less, homogeneous goods. In November 2000, the Russian Federal Ministry of Finance and the Federal Tax Police issued a report showing that oil companies sold to affiliate offshore trading companies at sub-market prices. The report said that the state was losing $ 9 bn a year (about 5 % of the gross domestic product) in tax receipts. 4 This example seems to demonstrate that political power of big oil companies may prevent tax authorities from punishment of those practices. In a similar way, capital flight through imports of homogenous commodities could be easily detected. Tikhomirov (1997) reported various Russian comparisons, published in newspapers, between the value of imports of wheat, maize, sunflower oil and white sugar at world prices and Russian contract prices. The difference was a US dollar 100 mn capital flight in 1994´. This huge difference could not be explained by freight costs.
Is a comparison between world and contract prices of an individual country a correct method? Some doubts arise. A first concern is indeed the cif/fob difference. A robust method should exclude such distortions. A second, more severe, concern is the term 'world price'. Even homogenous goods have different world prices: long-term contract prices of oil or gas differ from spot prices of the same quality. Table 1 provides an example about different world prices for 1994. We calculated from Eurostat unit values of exports and imports of wheat and maize. The first row reports the unit value of EU exports to Russia in two positions: wheat and meslin (chapter 10190), and maize or corn (chapter 1005 
Analyzing "pure" price differences in international trade
A systematic way to estimate the importance of capital flight via trade in manufactures goods is a unit-values analysis. Starting point is the assumption that capital flight is mirrored in international price differences. International customs statistics, however, do not report prices of individual commodities but rather trade values and quantities. Nevertheless, they base on information companies provide on fob or cif term. EU statistics, for example, report exports at fob term, hence, transportation cost, tariffs of the country of destination etc. is not included in prices. The traditional tool for gaining information on price developments from trade statistics are unit values obtained by dividing the export or import value by a quantity indicator, mostly metric tons. 5 The main problem with unit-value indexes roots in aggregation. The higher the level of aggregation the larger the bias from changes in the mix of commodities and countries of supply or demand. In the further we will use the term 'commodity prices' for all items at the 6-digit level of trade statistics. Some earlier studies used 5-digit levels (Kravis and Lipsey 1971) . Most recently applied indexes are constructed at the 7-digit level. We use the EU trade statistics that offers 8-and 6-digit levels. At 8-digit levels, many items would drop out, and the loss of information is not smaller than when using 6-digit levels.
Industry-level prices are calculated at the next higher level of aggregation, hence at the 4-digit. We start with industry-level unit values. Neglecting the minor bias of aggregation at the 6-digit levels we will find the impact of almost pure commodity price differences at the industry-level price index. The theory of index numbers helps to construct these price indexes.
For the construction of the adequate price index for our application out of unit-values let us start with three simple statements:
(1) P i is an industry-level vector of fixed prices p i of a commodities vector X i with i c= (1,....., M) commodities.
(2) The price index of the industry level, P(P i ) depends on the vector of fixed commodity prices, the quantitative vector and a quality vector A i . Then we can write
The nominator represents the industry-level value, the denominator the quality index of the quantitative bundle of commodities. If we define the unit-value at the industry-level as
(1) Then, in the bilateral case comprising two observation points in time or two economic agents I and II, the price index at the industry level P*(P i ) can be defined as
According to the economic theory of index numbers (for an overview see Diewert 1991) unit values do not automatically equal the arithmetic or geometric mean of price differences P(P i ) of a number M of commodities. Only if there were no difference in the quality vectors (A i ) in both observations we may assume that the industry-level prices are tantamount to the unit values.
After re-arrangement and taking the logs we obtain from (4) for the bilateral case
with P*(P i ) being the price difference at the industry level. The unit value then is the construct from the two component vectors of quality and price.
The crucialaspect in our study is the price index. Our considerations follow now the usual path in literature. Here, the theory of index numbers is microeconomically founded. Assume a given utility u of a so-called aggregator function F(x) with ( ) N x ,......., x x 1 ≡ quantities and fixed prices. Then consumers and producers minimize their expenditure. Doing this, the composition of the aggregator function as well as the price index of the commodity bundle is determined by the form of the aggregator function and the given utility u:
with C as expenditure function dependent on given u and p and being linearly homogeneous. Then, total expenditures are a product of the given utility level and the minimum costs for the production of one unit of this utility, c(p). Though this has not very much to do with reality, the approach allows for the development of price indices (including unit values), that fulfill various mathematical requirements. Index numbers with the best results are so-called 'superlative' index numbers, for example the Fisher index, the Törnquist index and the Walsh index. They are all geometric indexes. These indexes imply that each unit cost function belongs to an aggregator function F ('exact' indexes) and fulfills the product-test equality: The product of the price and the quantity index equals the value ratio of both observations I and II. All superlative index numbers can be used alternatively in empirical analysis. They approach to each other to less than 0.2 % in time serious analysis and to about 2 % in cross section analysis (Diewert 1991) .
In some recent studies the Törnquist-index has been used. In the bilateral case, the Törnquist-index is a share-weighted geometric mean: The problem with the bilateral price index is transitivity: results obtained heavily depend on the order in which observations are chosen for comparison. The bias is of minor importance in time-series application because of its natural ordering. The problem may, however, become significant for data c ontaining both time-series and crosssectional elements as in our study. A multilateral translog index is used to solve the problem: observations of individual commodities are weighted by average indexes __________________________________________________________________ IWH 13 containing information on all observations N of a given sample and, thus, the multilateral index is derived by taking the difference in two bilateral comparisons: This multilateral translog price index is used to measure the price of EU exports by country of destination. Equation (9) contains observable data from EU customs statistics and will further on serve for the empirical investigation of systematic price deviations in exports to Russia (Russian imports from the EU). The term 'systematic' includes some comparison with EU exports to other countries.
A pure price index would represent cost differences according to equation (6). Deviations between trade of a given country with various other countries are to explain by other determinants, that is price policy of companies in an environment of imperfect competition. The cost determinant can be excluded in our research because we use export data of the European Union implicitly assuming a certain production function for the entire Union (the same 'average' productivity, factor endowment). Since we cannot exclude industry specific effects we have to use some tests to determine the likelihood of fake invoicing practices.
Testing and results

Data and method
We use data from Eurostat Combined Nomenclature chapters 7 and 8. Chapters 70 throughout 81 include glass, pearls and base metals and articles thereof. Chapters 82 throughout 89 are products of machinery industries (Annex Table A ). We consider exports of the EU to Russia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. We calculate relative prices taking France as the EU benchmark. We believe that capital flight in the EU to France via transfer pricing or sham invoicing is not a significant practice of firms. Cif/fob differences do not distort our analysis since we use only export data.
One important feature of both sets of industries is that the EU run trade deficits in chapters 70-81 with the countries considered, but surpluses in chapters 82-89 (Annex Table B ). These industry specifics (possibly due to factor endowment differences) could have some influence over the channel of capital flight. Though we test EU exports for overpricing, capital flight might also occur via EU imports (underpricing).
Exports were taken at the 6-digit level (commodity level). The six-digit level was aggregated to the 4-digit level (industry-level). The entire sample contains 1,630 items which stand for about 61 % of all EU exports to Russia of chapters 3 to 8. Unit values were calculated from values and quantities for years 1996, 1997, 1998 and on average of these years. We assume capital flight to be particularly pronounced in this period. Price indexes on the industry level (4-digit) for Russia were related to indexes for France and compared with differentials of other transition countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania).
A problem typical for this kind of data generation is the lack of either quantitative or value entries in exports of some items at the 6-digit level. In these cases, data have to be imputed in order to avoid bias. We decided for the following imputation procedure:
-If one entry were missing, the average of the remaining two was taken.
-If two entries were missing, the reported one was taken for the remaining two.
-If all three entries in value or quantity were missing, the item was deleted from calculation.
Constructing i S and i p ln from 6-digit-level data we added all observable I i S and I i p ln and divided the sum by the number N of the observations. The maximum number of observations was 7 (7 countries x 1 average of three years). In case of some countries and years, the total number of observations may be lower since there were no data to calculate unit values or shares. We deleted all items for which the number of observations was less than six.
Results
The first step was to calculate mean values, standard deviations and the coefficient of variation of the entire panel and of two panels 70-81 and 82-89 (Table 2 ). At first inspection we observe values that represent higher prices in EU exports to Russia in chapters 70-81, but lower prices in exports in chapters 82-89. Since the latter represent more sophisticated and differentiated goods, the result is somewhat surprising. Capital flight from Russia in less and to Russia in more sophisticated goods? We compared the results with values obtained from EU exports to Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania. With the exception of exports to Bulgaria, prices in export of chapters 70-81 to Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania are more or less the same as prices in exports to France. In machinery and equipment exports, most exports to the other countries yielded a lower price than exports to France, like in the case of exports to Russia. The first conclusion then reads that false invoicing seems to be a strategy in Russian imports of less sophisticated goods, but not of machinery and transport equipment.
The next step was to test for the comparability of the mean values by double T-test (Table 3) . Since most H o < |1.96| in the panel 70-81 for Russia, we cannot reject the null hypothesis. Price differences between the countries in these chapters are not systematic (except to Bulgaria and cannot be compared. The picture changes for the panel consisting of chapters 82-89. In exports of machinery and transport equipment the test reveals the comparability of mean values, though EU export prices are lower than prices in EU exports to France.
How could we explain these results?
A first possible explanation is that price differences reflect a pricing-to-markets strategy of firms in machinery and transport equipment. This strategy considers differences in the countries' purchasing power. When the GDP per capita of the Czech Republic is higher than in Bulgaria, EU exporters might charge a higher price for the same good. Indeed, among the other CEE countries, relative prices (measured in terms of France) in exports to Bulgaria are the lowest compared with Poland, the Czech Republic or Romania. Russia's purchasing power is lower than that of EU and other candidate countries (but relatively close to that of Bulgaria). 7 A second explanation effect is transfer pricing being evident in trade with candidate countries but not with Russia. EU direct investment are higher in EU candidate countries than in Russia (measured per capita), and they concentrate more on machinery and transport equipment than in Russia. It is more plausible to assume intra-firm trade with candidate countries than with Russia. Hence, transfer pricing might have played a significant role in this trade, but not in trade with Russia.
The third proposal reads simply that capital flight from Russia in chapters 70-81 could occur mainly via EU imports and not exports (remember the trade balances of both panels).
Further testing
Last but not least, the method applied yields plausible results only when it detects chapters with capital flight indication. We extended our tests to two 4-digit industries where other sources report or assume the major part of Russian capital flight through exports (underpricing): crude oil (chapter 27090000) and non-sophisticated crude oil products (chapter 2710). In both of them, the EU runs large deficits in trade with Russia (Table C) . Crude oil imports of the EU are reported at the 6-digit level. Chapter 2710, however, consists of 48 different products. The benchmark country are imports of the EU from Norway in both cases. For constructing the multilateral price index we selected as further countries: Algeria, Lybia, Nigeria, Saudi-Arabia, and Syria. We applied the same procedure for calculating the price indices, but distinct to our former calculations we deleted all items where the number of observations was less than three (relevant for chapter 2710 only). 8
In both cases, prices of EU imports from Russia are below prices in imports from Norway. Measured by the deviation from the mean value, Russian prices are the lowest, particularly in industry 2710. While EUROSTAT does not provide various natural qualities of crude oil imports (content of sulphur, for example), the modest price deviations in crude oil imports of the EU might yet explain quality differences. Results for chapter 2710 seem to be more explainable: price deviations are more pronounced. Capital flight through underpricing by Russian exporters might be an actual strategy, not easily to detect by tax authorities. 
Conclusions
We applied a new method in analyzing trade-related capital flight. Pure price differences were calculated by the help of a multilateral Törnquist price index. We concentrated the analysis on 1.630 items in EU exports in CN chapters 7 and 8 to Russia. Bulgaria. the Czech Republic. Hungary. Poland and Romania and used EU intra-exports to France as IWH __________________________________________________________________ 20 benchmark. Mean values were analysed by the double T-test. We found no evidence of capital flight by the overpricing of exports to Russia. We conclude. that capital flight from Russia via false invoicing of Russian imports is of minor importance. We found rather some evidence for transfer pricing in EU exports to the candidate countries considered here in comparison with Russia. We found further some evidence of underpricing of EU imports of crude oil and non-sophisticated oil products. 
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